https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-018-0851-7

Abstract

Can an Artificial Intelligence make distinctions among major works of politics, philosophy, and fiction without human assistance?  In this paper, Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) is used to find patterns in a relatively small sample of notable works archived by Project Gutenberg.  It is shown that an LSA-equipped AI can distinguish quite sharply between fiction and non-fiction works, and can detect some differences between political philosophy and history, and between conventional fiction and fantasy/science fiction.  It is conjectured that this capability is a step in the direction of “M-comprehension” (or “machine comprehension”) by AIs.

 

Keywords:  Artificial Intelligence, Latent Semantic Analysis, natural language processing, textual analysis

AI & Society (2018)

 

Abstract
The effect of the spread of Artificial Intelligence (AI) on wages depends on both the form of aggregate production relationships and the elasticity of substitution between human and robotic labor. With a conventional production function involving labor, robots, and ordinary capital, an increase in robotic labor can have either a positive or a negative effect on wages. Alternatively, it is possible to estimate the aggregate production relationship without measuring capital or other fixed factors explicitly, using the procedure developed by Houthakker in the 1950s. Houthakker’s method is based on the probability distribution of the productivity of the variable factor. Fitting different distributions to cross-sectional data on U.S. productivity, it is shown that if the elasticity of substitution between human and robotic labor is greater than about 1.9, the burgeoning of AI technologies will cause a decline in aggregate wages, other things equal. For the manufacturing sector, an even smaller human-robot elasticity of substitution is likely to result in declining wages of industrial workers as robots proliferate.

Journal of Macroeconomics, Volume 49, September 2016, Pages 280-291.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2016.08.003

 

Abstract

Alexander Wendt’s Quantum Mind and Social Science is an effort to establish foundations of social science based on the ontology of modern physics. The quantum revolution has deservedly had repercussions in many sciences, but it is unwise to ground social science on physical theories, which are subject to constant revision. Additionally, despite its empirical success, there is no agreed-upon interpretation of quantum theory. Finally, even if there were, the random indeterminacy intrinsic to the quantum world cannot account for the intentionality of human action. Intentional agents act for reasons, not at random; nor are the reasons chosen at random.

Critical Review 29(2):  121-140 (2017)

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2017.1316454

 

Abstract

 

Various potential strategic interactions between a “strong” Artificial intelligence (AI) and humans are analyzed using simple 2 × 2 order games, drawing on the New Periodic Table of those games developed by Robinson and Goforth (The topology of the 2 × 2 games: a new periodic table. Routledge, London, 2005). Strong risk aversion on the part of the human player(s) leads to shutting down the AI research program, but alternative preference orderings by the human and the AI result in Nash equilibria with interesting properties. Some of the AI-Human games have multiple equilibria, and in other cases Pareto-improvement over the Nash equilibrium could be attained if the AI’s behavior towards humans could be guaranteed to be benign. The preferences of a superintelligent AI cannot be known in advance, but speculation is possible as to its ranking of alternative states of the world, and how it might assimilate the accumulated wisdom (and folly) of humanity.

AI & Society, 2018.  https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs00146-017-0732-5

Read-only link:  http://rdcu.be/s9ls

 

“Rational Expectations and Learning from Experience,” Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 93, 1979

 

Introduction

The burgeoning literature employing or alluding to the concept of rational expectations in time-dependent economic processes is strangely vague regarding possible mechanisms by which the economic agents could actually achieve the hypothesized “rationality.” Muth (1961) assumed that the formation of expectations according to his optimality criterion would have survival value in a competitive environment. However, it is almost self-evident that competition will drive out “irrational” producers only if the costs and technical difficulties of arriving at rational expectations are outweighed by the benefits. Muth made no attempt to specify a method, other than explicit computation of the rational forecasts based on complete knowledge of all market parameters and the time structure of the disturbance process, by which a maximizing producer could consciously improve the quality of his predictions. If no such algorithm based on information and computational techniques available to agents at some “reasonable” cost (i.e., a cost less than the benefits of accurate forecasts) exists, “rational expectations” as defined by Muth may be irrelevant to income-maximizing economic agents (Feige and Pearce 1976). [Footnote and references omitted.]

“Economic Losses from Forecasting Error in Agriculture,” Journal of Political Economy Vol. 88(2) (April 1980):  234-58.

Abstract

This paper develops a new method for estimating economic losses from forecasting error. The method is an alternative to the traditional distributed lag approach to estimating expectations. An application to Kansas agriculture over the period 1874-1933 reveals significant variation in farmers’ price forecasting performance across counties and over time. These differences can be explained in terms of market improvements, technological and geographical factors, and county characteristics suggestive of human capital differences. The magnitudes, timing, and cross-sectional pattern of the losses from forecasting error confirm the importance of forecasting skill and allocative ability in American agriculture during the period examined.

 

“Game Theory and Climate Diplomacy” (with Anders Fremstad), Ecological Economics 85 (2013): 177-187

Abstract

Starting with the “New Periodic Table” (NPT) of 2×2 order games introduced by Robinson and Goforth (2005), we provide an exhaustive treatment of the possible game-theoretic characterizations of climate negotiations between two players (e.g., Great Powers or coalitions of states). Of the 144 distinct 2×2 games in which the players have strict ordinally ranked utilities, 25 are potentially relevant to climate problem. The negotiations may be characterized as a No-Conflict Game, Prisoner’s Dilemma, Coordination Game, Chicken, Type Game, or Cycle, depending on the payoff matrix. Which game corresponds to the actual state of the world depends both on the severity of risks associated with climate change and the perceptions of the governments engaged in the negotiations. Nash equilibrium or Maxi-min equilibrium (or neither) may be the outcome. Achieving universal abatement of greenhouse gas emissions may require side payments or enforcement mechanisms outside the game framework, but we show how the negotiations themselves may offer opportunities to select between Nash equilibria or alter the payoff rankings and strategic choices of the players. In particular, scientific information pointing to the severity of the risks of climate change suggests characterization of the negotiations as a Coordination Game rather than a Prisoner’s Dilemma.

“Investment in Energy Efficiency: Do the Characteristics of Firms Matter?” (with William E. Watkins) Review of Economics and Statistics 80, 1998

Abstract

The literature on energy efficiency provides numerous examples of apparently profitable technologies that are not universally adopted. Yet according to the standard neoclassical theory of investment, profit-maximizing firms should undertake all investments with a positive net present value. The standard theory also holds that the discount rate for computing the present value of a project should be the return available on other projects in the same risk class, and therefore should not depend on characteristics of the firm. This model as applied to energy-saving investments is tested by examining whether firms’ characteristics influence their decision to join the Environmental Protection Agency’s voluntary Green Lights program. A discrete choice regression is estimated over a large sample of participating and nonparticipating firms. Missing values in the data matrix are replaced with multiple imputations from a distribution estimated using the expectation–maximization algorithm. The results show that (1) substantial improvements in the power of hypothesis tests can be achieved through maximum-likelihood imputation of missing data, and (2) contrary to the conventional theory, the characteristics of firms do affect their decision to join Green Lights and commit to a program of investments in lighting efficiency.